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Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a concept of secret key exchange supported by fundamen-
tals of quantum physics. Its perfect realization offers unconditional key security, however, known
practical schemes are potentially vulnerable if the quantum channel loss exceeds a certain realization-
specific bound. This discrepancy is caused by the fact that any practical photon source has a non-zero
probability of emitting two or more photons at a time, while theory needs exactly one. We report an
essentially different QKD scheme based on both quantum physics and theory of relativity. It works
flawlessly with practical photon sources at arbitrary large channel loss. Our scheme is naturally
tailored for free-space optical channels, and may be used in ground-to-satellite communications,
where losses are prohibitively large and unpredictable for conventional QKD.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Ex
Quantum cryptography [1–6] gained its popularity
from a promise of its absolute security against eavesdrop-
ping. In this sense, “absolute” means that it is guaran-
teed by fundamental laws of physics, rather than by our
technological abilities. Nowadays, QKD is arguably the
only practical technology explicitly operating with prop-
erties of the quantum world. At the same time, practi-
cal QKD is a serious challenge for scientists, because all
implementations are somewhat different from underlying
theoretical models. Two major problems are the lack of
true single-photon sources [7, 8] and the presence of loss
in quantum channel; neither of them can be perfectly
eliminated. In result, known protocols guarantee key se-
curity only if losses do not exceed a certain realization-
specific level. In this paper we address this issue and
demonstrate a relativistic protocol taking into account
relativistic properties of our world, which guarantee key
security regardless of the particular channel loss.
Conventional, non-relativistic, quantum cryptography
is based on fundamental principles of quantum mechan-
ics [9, 10], however, it is not directly tied to elementary
particles or other physical objects that carry transmitted
quantum states. In the proposed relativistic quantum
cryptography it must be a massless particle traveling at
the speed of light, i.e. a photon, that carries informa-
tion. This makes a difference if the space-time structure
of the communication in Minkowsky space is taken into
account, calling to nonexistence of faster-than-light infor-
mation transmission. This explicit connection with the
space-time is completely ignored in conventional QKD
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protocols.
Our protocol is based on time-spread coherent quan-
tum states, which, due to their distributed nature in-
evitably cause delays, if successful intercept and resend
attack is performed. Thus, detection of adversary actions
can be performed by controlling both detection errors and
signal delays. This eventually makes the protocol com-
pletely immune to arbitrarily large loss in the quantum
channel and creates a potential for its use in ground-to-
satellite free space quantum links enabling global QKD
service [6].
As signal delays play a critical role in our relativistic
approach, the protocol is only viable for line-of-sight free
space communication links, where no alternative short-
cut paths are possible and the signal propagates at the
speed of light. Importantly, the protocol is tolerant to
the presence of air in the light path, which slightly de-
lays the signal vs. the vacuum speed of light; it only
requires enough time-spreading of the transmitted quan-
tum states. In typical conditions it requires about 1 ns
of spreading per kilometer of the transmission distance
in air, topping to less than 20 ns for ground-to-satellite
links.
Although keeping track of precise timing requires, in
general, external clock synchronization, the proposed
protocol takes care of clock synchronization between the
communicating parties Alice and Bob by itself; no other
external synchronization scheme is needed. At the same
time the protocol requires an a-priori knowledge of a dis-
tance between the parties, which is essential, e.g. if the
adversary Eve chooses to delay any light transmissions
between Alice and Bob.
The understanding that special relativity may offer
new features to quantum cryptography, was around as
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2early as in 1990s, when the first relativistic quantum pro-
tocol on orthogonal states was proposed [11–16]. Another
use of relativistic causality in QKD was demonstrated
in [17], where a two-fold increase of key generation rate
for BB84 protocol [1] was shown.
Even more substantial changes relativity provided for
bit commitment protocols [18–22], which are prohibited
in a conventional quantum world by the Mayers-Lo-Chau
no-go theorems [23–25]. The search for qualitatively new
features in QKD was on since an early work [26] in 2001.
Followed by a series of publications, these ideas distilled
into a practical relativistic QKD protocol [27–29], exper-
imentally demonstrated in the present work for the first
time.
The main features of the realized relativistic protocol
include: (i) spreading of quantum states does not have to
be as large as the channel length; it only has to compen-
sate for delays in the channel with respect to the ideal
one with the vacuum speed of light; (ii) as relativistic
principles allow for clock synchronization, no other ex-
ternal synchronization is required; (iii) the protocol pro-
vides unconditional key security even with conventional
faint laser pulses at arbitrarily large channel loss; prac-
tical limitations on the channel loss are only determined
by the dark count rate in the single photon detector used.
The realized system has a double-pass configuration,
where optical pulses initially generated by Bob are first
transmitted to Alice as classical signals. Alice in turn at-
tenuates the received signals to quantum level, encodes
them with randomly chosen bits and sends back to Bob.
Bob detects them at exactly calculated moments in time,
choosing his measurement basis at random. Such config-
uration allows reusing the same fiber delay interferom-
eter, installed at Bob’s, and does not require its phase
stabilization.
The protocol serves for the two goals: first, to provide
relativistic QKD by itself and, second, to synchronize the
clocks between Alice and Bob. The first goal is achieved
by the following procedure shown in figure 1 as a space-
time diagram. Alice receives from Bob pairs of short
optical pulses spread in time by a fixed amount ∆t. As
each pair is generated in the delay interferometer from a
single laser pulse, the pair would interfere destructively
in the detector port of the interferometer if returned to
Bob without any phase shifts. Alice flips a coin to decide
whether to change the phase of the second pulse by ϕ
or not. After performing (or not performing) the modu-
lation she attenuates the pulses to achieve a pre-defined
average number of photons µ in each of the pulses and
sends them back to Bob. Bob also randomly chooses
whether to apply an additional phase shift ϕ to the first
pulse or not and detects the result of their interference
exactly at the time T after initial pulse generation. This
value T should be equal to the round-trip time with the
accuracy better than ∆t. All time delays shorter than
∆t are considered insignificant.
As one may notice, so far the protocol directly repeats
the B92 protocol [30], so where does relativity come into
Alice Bob
M
M
irr
or
M
irr
or
M
Eve
Distance
Time
BS
SPAD
T 1
T 2
α 
e 
  
iφb
A
 α
e 
  
iφb
B
 α
BS
T
0 Laser
M
irr
or
bA
bB
FIG. 1: Space-time diagram of the line-of-sight free-
space quantum channel operation. M — phase modula-
tor, |α〉 — coherent quantum state with the average number
of photons |α|2 = µ, BS — beam splitter, SPAD — single-
photon avalanche detector. Each transmission is initiated by
Bob, who sends a classical laser pulse, split into two in the de-
lay interferometer. Alice attenuates both copies of the pulse
to a quantum level, reflects them off the mirror, and mod-
ulates the phase of the second one with her random bit of
information bA. Thus, the quantum transmission from Alice
to Bob consists of a pair of coherent states, which are then
tested by Bob in the delay interferometer using phase modu-
lation of the first state with his random bit bB . Inability of
faster-than-light communication prevents Eve from successful
eavesdropping because she cannot undo her decision about the
first pulse made at time T1, when she gets the “data” pulse
at the moment T2. Any attempts of eavesdropping result in
detection errors at the Bob’s side or in additional signal de-
lays, which are equivalent to losses because Bob only detects
signals in his short detection window at time T .
play? An explanation is given by the following argument.
There are two weak coherent states in the channel: |α〉
going first and |eiϕ bAα〉, where bA is the bit sent by Alice
and α =
√
µeiϕ0 . The first state carries no information
and is considered to be known by Eve. However, Bob
will use it to test the data state traveling later, thus, it
is essential for the communication. If the first state gets
blocked in the transmission line, Bob’s measurement re-
sult will not depend on his modulator setting, which will
result in the 50% error rate. If, similarly, the second,
data, state is missing, while the first is present, Bob ap-
parently gets 50% errors again.
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FIG. 2: Space-time diagram of a series of transmis-
sions, realizing clock synchronization between Al-
ice and Bob. Initiating each transmission, Bob randomly
chooses whether to transmit at the beginning of a time slot
of size t0 or to transmit delayed. This creates a unique Bob’s
timing sequence. Alice compares her observed timing se-
quence with that of Bob and if they differ, Alice and Bob
discard corresponding raw key sequence. As Bob’s timing in-
formation reaches Alice with the maximum possible speed —
the speed of light — Eve’s attempts to pre-poll Alice’s ran-
dom bit bA (see figure 1), keeping the timing sequence the
same, fail due to inability of faster than light delivery of tim-
ing sequence from Bob to Alice.
Eve may choose whether to block or do not block the
first state in the line, but when she receives the sec-
ond one, she faces uncertainty of the quantum world: as
the data carrier states are not orthogonal to each other∣∣〈eiϕα|α〉∣∣ = exp[−2|α|2 sin2(ϕ/2)] > 0, it is not possi-
ble to guarantee reconstruction of the bit sent. If Eve
succeeds in obtaining the bit, e.g. with an unambiguous
measurement, she is okay only in the case if she has let
the first state propagate in the line, because otherwise
Bob would see an error. If she fails to get the bit, she
is okay only if the first state has been blocked. Due to
relativistic causality she cannot correct for her decision
about the first pulse made earlier, as there is no faster-
than-light communication. Thus, introduction of errors
into the line by Eve now does not depend on the channel
loss.
The second inherent part of the protocol guarantees
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FIG. 3: Experimental setup. SPAD – single photon
avalanche detector, BS – beam splitter, PC – polarization con-
troller, M – phase modulator, PIN – PIN photodiode, ATT -
attenuator. The setup consists of two fiber optic modules, Al-
ice and Bob, and a free-space optical channel between them.
Phase-time encoding and decoding is performed in the same
fiber delay interferometer located at the Bob’s side. Detection
of photons by the SPAD is performed in the middle time slot,
which corresponds to interference between the two halves of
the transmitted pulse.
clock synchronization between Alice and Bob. If it was
missing, Eve could use a fake pair of pulses to poll Al-
ice’s bit before getting a real signal from Bob. In this
case Eve would always know whether she was success-
ful with the last measurement by the time she needs to
make a decision about the first state, which results in
successful cracking of the protocol. To avoid that Bob
sends his pulses aperiodically: in each data clock cycle
he randomly chooses between the two time positions to
send the pulse as shown in figure 2. This additional bit of
information cannot reach Alice earlier than it does under
normal system operation. Any attempts of Eve to pre-
poll Alice’s bits will result in a different time sequence
observed by Alice, because to keep it, transmission of
the timing data from Bob to Alice would have been done
superluminally. According to the protocol, after series
of transmissions Alice and Bob compare their recorded
timing data, taken by their unsynchronized, but precise
in relative measurement clocks, and if they observe errors
in the timing sequence, they discard the whole series.
Having realized both clock synchronization and key
distribution in a single setup, we arrive at a relativis-
tic protocol, where unlike the conventional QKD, optical
loss and errors caused by the eavesdropper are completely
decoupled. Thus, even at an arbitrarily large channel loss
and unlimited Eve’s resources, any extra information ob-
tained by Eve results in an increase of detection errors
observed by Bob and detection of the intrusion.
The realized experimental system (figure 3) is an opti-
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FIG. 4: Experimentally measured bit error rate and
the obtained key lengths. During the run over 55 m long
free space channel Alice was checking her observed timing
sequence and compared it with that used by Bob. No tim-
ing errors were observed. Average number of photons per
modulated pulse was kept at µ = 0.1 and a depth of phase
modulation was equal 130◦. Detection of arriving photons was
performed by Bob in a 4-ns time window, which is 5.5 times
less than ∆t = 22 ns, satisfying the requirements of the rela-
tivistic protocol.
cal fiber-based setup working at the wavelength of 850
nm with a 55 m long free-space channel between Al-
ice and Bob (see Appendix B: Experimental setup.) In
this demonstration with the clock rate of 250 kHz and
µ = 0.1 photons per pulse we obtained the average of
16.1 raw bits per series of 32768 pulses with a 3.5% quan-
tum bit error ratio as shown in figure 4. This corresponds
to a raw key generation rate of 123 bits/s and the secret
key rate of 47 bits/s.
To conclude, we have proposed and experimentally
demonstrated a novel type of QKD protocols based on
the principle of relativistic causality. Security of such a
scheme with a conventional faint laser photon source does
not depend on a loss in the quantum channel, so it can
be readily used for unconditionally secure satellite-based
QKD networking, with the only practical reach limit in
the presence of dark photodetector counts.
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Appendix A: Secret key rate.
Here we present a brief asymptotic analysis of the pro-
tocol performance, while a comprehensive study includ-
ing finite sequences can be found in [29]. The secret key
rate is bounded by
R = lim
n→∞
lsecr
n
≤ (1− η)(1− C(ϕ))− η − h(pe),
where η is the fraction of errors in the received timing se-
quence (assumed to be zero throughout the paper), h(x)
— binary entropy function, pe — bit error probability,
and C(ϕ) — Holevo bound [31] on classical throughput of
the quantum channel with states |α〉 and |eiϕα〉; C(ϕ) =
h
(
1−ε
2
)
, where ε = |〈α|eiϕα〉| = exp (−2µ sin2(ϕ/2)).
Typically in the experiments (when there is no active
eavesdropping) there are no errors in the received timing
sequences, therefore we have chosen a simple strategy of
discarding all pakets with timing errors. In this case η =
0 and the above expression becomes R ≤ 1−C(ϕ)−h(pe),
which has a simple intuitive interpretation: if we assume
that all classical information that could be derived from
the sent quantum sequence is known to Eve, from each
raw bit we should subtract Eve’s information C(ϕ) and
the entropy associated with bit errors in the raw sequence
h(pe).
One can also notice that there is an ambiguity of choos-
ing µ and ϕ for a particular value of C(ϕ). However, from
a practical point of view it is convenient to keep ϕ close
to pi to minimize the effect of experimental errors. In the
particular experimental realization C(ϕ) = 0.387 bits,
and the secret key rate depends on the observed pe. Im-
portantly, if the rate R becomes zero or even negative,
as in the case of a large µ and a non-zero pe, there is no
private shared information between Alice and Bob, i.e.
all the raw key bits obtained have to be discarded.
Appendix B: Experimental setup.
To generate optical pulses we use a directly modu-
lated Fabri-Perot laser diode (QPhotonics QFLD-850-
75S), which emits 4 ns long pulses at the wavelength
of 850 nm. The delay interferometer is fusion spliced
from a single-mode fiber HP780 and comprises a polariza-
tion controller (General Photonics PCD-M02-4X-NC-4)
in one of the arms. We use lithium-niobate phase mod-
ulators (Photline NIR-MPX800-LN-05) and mechanical
variable optical attenuators (OZ Optics DD-100-11-850-
5/125-S-50) for further light processing. The transmis-
sion line is constructed from a pair of free-space couplers
(Micro Laser Systems, Inc. FC20-NIR-T) with an out-
put aperture of 23 mm placed on tripods; the channel
loss is estimated as 3 dB. The setup on the other side of
the free-space channel (Alice) is made of the same compo-
nents and works in a slave mode. A signal from the PIN1
photodetector activates the setup, which selectively mod-
ulates the second optical pulse after its reflection from the
mirror (OZ Optics FORF-11P-850-5/125-P). All random
number generators in the whole system (two of them con-
trol corresponding phase modulators and one creates a
timing sequence) are emulated by a pair of linear feed-
back shift register-based pseudo random generators with
5a sequence length of 220−1 working synchronously on the
both sides of the channel. Thus, this proof-of-principle
setup does not require a classical communication channel.
Single-photon detection is performed with a thermoelec-
trically cooled actively quenched avalanche photodiode
(Excelitas C30902SH), having a 30% detection efficiency.
Appendix C: Single-mode free-space channel
requirements.
An ideal single-mode free-space channel is described
by a paraxial wave equation with a solution in the form
of a Gaussian beam. Beam diffraction limits the maxi-
mal length of the line, which becomes dependent on the
lens diameter. In a general symmetric configuration the
channel length
L =
2piw2
λ
w0
w
√
1−
(w0
w
)2
,
where w0 is the beam waist, and w – radius of the beam
at the lens. The length is maximized at w0/w = 1/
√
2,
as shown in Fig. 5a. In this configuration
L =
piw2
λ
= 2
piw20
λ
= 2zR,
where zR is the Rayleigh length.
In our current implementation with 23 mm diameter
free-space couplers, the radius w equals 5.8 mm, resulting
in the working transmission distance up to L ≈ 125 m.
The demonstrated distance of 55 m, thus, should be con-
sidered as a proof-of-principle demonstration limited by
the length of the hallway, rather than the actual range
of the system. Larger, kilometer range, distances may be
covered with larger free-space couplers or telescopes. As
optical loss in such free-space lines strongly depends on
atmospheric turbulence and fluctuates with time, the key
generation rate may vary drastically, but without com-
promising system security due to the unique properties
of the relativistic quantum key distribution.
Appendix D: Hardware implementation.
Overall, the system consists of two boxes housing Alice
and Bob, and a pair of tripods with the free-space cou-
plers mounted on them, see Fig. 5b,c. The boxes contain
no free-space optical components so all light processing
is realized in single-mode fiber-optic elements. Each box
is connected to a free-space coupler via a single-mode
fiber and may be connected to a computer with a USB
interface.
All electronics controlling generation, processing and
detection of optical signals is packaged in the same boxes
side by side with optical components as shown in Fig. 6.
High-speed electronic functions are directly performed by
a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), which forms
FIG. 5: Experimental realization. a, Optimal configura-
tion of the free-space channel, achieving the longest transmis-
sion distance L; w0 – beam waist, zR – Rayleigh length. The
figure shows two single-mode fiber tips and two lenses forming
a Gaussian beam. Horizontal dimensions are not to scale. b,
’Alice’ station with a free-space coupler on a tripod. c, ’Bob’
station comprising a free-space coupler, the station itself, and
a laptop computer for data collection and analysis.
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FIG. 6: Hardware implementation of the Bob’s sta-
tion. The station is packaged in a metal box with a cover,
which has control knobs, buttons, and a small LCD display for
visualization of the main operation parameters. It connects to
a computer via a USB cable for transmission of the obtained
raw keys as well as for exchange of control information.
the core of each box. Auxiliary functions such as com-
puter connectivity, display control, etc. are performed in
a microcontroller.
6Appendix E: Comparison with previous relativistic
approaches.
The first relativistic QKD protocol was proposed in
1995 [11], where due to relativistic causality it was pos-
sible to use orthogonal quantum states. As discussed
in [12, 13], the actual states in the channel are not or-
thogonal because each state as a whole is never present
in the channel. This approach can be classified as a
whole class of relativistic protocols with quantum states
spread for more than the channel length. Interestingly,
the same idea of only partial quantum state presence in
the channel, later found another application in counter-
factual QKD [32, 33].
Following the first pioneer work, in [14] it was shown
that transmission at unknown random moments of time
is not required if globally non-orthogonal quantum states
are used instead. Even with this modification, the pro-
tocol remained quite impractical as it requires on-site
phase-stable delays equal to the time-of-flight between
Alice and Bob and also precise clock synchronization be-
tween the parties. Nevertheless, it has been recently re-
alized as a table-top experiment [15] and even as a 1
km long fiber realization [16]. Further theoretical devel-
opments [34] allowed to use shorter time delays and to
obtain more than one secret key bit per photon trans-
mitted, however, the requirement of a true single photon
source and a lossless channel remained.
The next major breakthrough in relativistic quantum
cryptography happened with the invention of relativistic
bit commitment protocols [18, 19]. Without relativity
principles, as has been shown earlier by Mayers, Lo, and
Chau, quantum bit commitment is impossible [23–25].
This is probably the first example of substantially new
quantum cryptography protocol enabled by adding the
theory of relativity. Later a few other relativistic bit
commitment protocols have been proposed [20, 21] and
even demonstrated experimentally [22].
The present paper shows a particular realization of
a fundamentally new relativistic QKD approach, which
uses relativistic principles to strengthen conventional
QKD protocols. In result, the new relativistic protocols
demonstrate unconditional security of generated keys, re-
gardless of the quantum channel loss and with classical
photon sources. It has to be mentioned that the pro-
posed principle can be used as a general framework for fu-
ture relativistic QKD protocols, whose application range
is much superior than for conventional, non-relativistic
QKD.
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